When considering theories regarding the relationship between the mind and the brain, identity theory plays an important role in our investigation. The identity theory of mind is the idea that 'each and every mental state is identical with some state in the brain'. Unlike similar theories, the identity theory does not simply want to make the claim that mind states correlate with brain states, but instead, hopes to prove that the two are identical. According to this line of argument, my desire for a slice of chocolate cake, my thirst and my belief that the lights in the room have begun to flash all sorts of colours, are all states of my brain. Identity theorists, unlike dualists, believe there is an aggregation of the mental unified as one, in the form of a physical entity, this being the brain. Whilst the theory is favoured due to its predictions of the existence of mind-brain correlations without appealing to mind-independent realms, it does face some problems. Enquiring into difficulties such as multiple realizablity and Leibniz's law of indiscernible identicals, we shall determine to what extent the theory is capable of being saved by defending itself of such critiques.

In order to determine whether the identity theory can be plausibly defended, we must first outline the theory further. When concentrating on the identity theory we can distinguish between two kinds of identity; types and tokens. Type theorists are concerned with kinds of things and not specifics. For example, type identity theorists focus on cats and their experience of pain, whereas a token identity theorist would focus closer on each specific cat in question, like Simon's cat, Bruno. For the most part, we will be concerned with the type identity theory. Advocated by Smart and Place, the type identity theory is the idea that 'mental states are physical states of the brain'. Exploring type identity, Smart thought the best way to illustrate the idea was to highlight this through examples of objects and ideas bearing the same relationship. Brain states and mind states then, obtain a similar relationship to that of water and h2O, and lightning to atmospheric electrical charge. Analogies such as these are especially important for the theory, as they highlight the two identities are not merely lawfully correlated, but are to be valued as one and the same thing, They are to be understood as analogous, resulting in Smart advocating an ontological simplicity through the use of an Occam's razor approach to the mind brain relationship. Just like whenever there is lighting there is an electrical discharge, whenever there is a mind state, there is also a brain state. For example, whenever I experience pain, there is some C-fibers firing which make me experience such pain, It follows from such an example, we are to understand that the C-fibers firing and the pain experienced are to be understood as one phenomenon. Through this law of parsimony, the extra entities which dualism appeals to are not needed, the theory need not appeal to anything non-material as the material states and processes alone are capable of this. If the theory can show that both mind and brain states are a part of a physical unity, it has succeeded. However, if it cannot show that mind states are material the way the brain states are, the theory becomes increasingly difficult to save.

The plausibility of the mind-brain identity theory becomes dubious when we begin to question the locations of certain types of feelings. Through Leibniz's law of indiscernible identicals, anything which is identical must be completely identical in its properties. For example if X and Y are identical, X's properties will be the same as Y's properties. If all of the properties of mind states are the same as the properties of the brain states then problems do not arise, however there has been many attempts to prove that because mind states have properties which differ to brain states, they cannot be identical. One example of this is to reason my pain is in my foot, however it is obvious that my C-fibers firing are not. If my pain has a location like the pain being in my foot, brain states and mind states cannot be identical. The pain in my foot would have a location distinctly different from that of my brain states or C-fibers which would be located in my brain. In response to this, the identity theorist believes we are wrong when we say we have a pain in our foot, instead, we should refer to this feeling as an 'in-the-foot' kind of pain with each separate location of pain in the body being referred to different brain state. To make clear, say we experience the pain in our foot, such a pain relates to the brain state B12, however, if we were to experience pain somewhere entirely different, like our elbow we would be experiencing a brain state b4. The pain is not actually located in your foot, but instead is a representation of pain found in your brain state. Such a reply seems appealing, as not only does it keep the identity between the mind and brain intact, but it also has scope for being actualised in cases concerning phantom pains. There are cases of people who have had their leg amputated, and following this, have claimed to still be able to experience pain in their leg, despite not having a leg. Such a reply and an example to make reference to, results in the theory plausibly defending itself my acknowledging location as a representation and not as an object or property.

Following this, Leibniz's Law of indiscernible identicals further adds to the problem of identity through identifying specific feelings of pains. Objecting to the identity theory one could raise the question 'my pain is sharp but what in my brain is sharp?'. In a similar way to the last questions reply, the identity theorist argues, to consider a pain sharp, is again, to be misunderstood with regards to realising pain, The person who takes this line of argument is understanding 'sharp' too literally. Instead, we are to understand such properties of pain as relating to different brain states. To add to this, Place wants to make clear the mistake we are making is when we are describing our experiences and how things smell, taste and feel, we are appealing to things in the phenomenal field, when in reality, we are undergoing an experience in the mind of something going on which is like what is going on when something has hurt me in a sharp way. To have a throbbing pain is to have a brain state relating to pains which feel as through they are throbbing whereas a sharp pain, is to have a separate brain state which is identified with only sharp pains, with sharp and throbbing used as concepts in order to describe the experience of the goings on when undergoing experiences. As a result, 'when we appear to attribute properties to the pain, we are attributing concepts to the pain experience', such experiences which are identical with brain states.

A further application of Leibniz's law proves the hardest fort he identity theory to defend. Colin McGinn considers qualia, our phenomenological experiences and mental states, such as having pain and feeling sick and how they feel to us. When we consider pains, we are aware they hurt, we state "i am in pain" or "it hurts". McGinn argues, 'how could technicolor consciousness arise from grey brain matter?". In other words, how can we experience pain consciously, if our brains are focussed and limited to the unconscious realm? We have consciousness of pain and its ability to hurt us, but no consciousness of what goes on in our own brains, Through this understanding it seems that pains have the property of hurting which brains do not. McGinn's argument shows that if pains have the property of hurting, it logically follows that pain cannot be identical to C-fibers firing on the basis that they do not have the property of hurting, As a result, with regards to Leibniz's law, the identity theory plausibly defends itself from two out of three problems posed, however McGinn's criticism proves difficult to rebuff.

Leibniz's law of indiscernibles is not the only problem the identity theory faces. Asymmetry in relation to first and third person access to mental states poses many difficulties. We understand ourselves to have privileged first person access to our own independent thoughts and sensory experiences, while everyone else has third person access to our mental life. In other worlds, 'I infer your thoughts and feelings by observing your circumstances, demeanour and behaviour', I have no way of actually knowing them unless you make them apparent to me. If we were to observe brain happenings, I amy be able to comprehend what you may be feeling or thinking, but my access of such thoughts and feelings differs greatly from yours. Instead of appealing to private thought chambers like the dualist does, Place urges us to consider access of the brain like that of a doctor's observations of your stomach. In contrast, our knowledge of our mental life is unmeditated, we do not need observe or recognise our own feelings or thoughts through any further inward investigation, these mind states are just self-revealing to us. As a result, Place highlights how it is reasonable to state, as the theory does, that there can remain a certain asymmetry to mind and brain states, yet the two remain identical.

When considering the identity theory, some have opted for an adapted version of the theory, known as restricted identity theory. Such a theory restricts identities of mind and body dependent species in question and is concerned with multiple realizability. However, the adaptation too, is not without criticism. Animals of various sorts, undergo and realise pains in a multitude of ways. in humans we may suppose our pain is realised through the C-fibers firing. However, when we consider different sorts of animals, we realise they are neurologically and biologically different to us, therefore their nervous systems will also be dramatically different to ours. This raises serious problems as Hilary Putnam notes. We have already established that the identity theory holds the view that mind states and brain states are identical however if pain equals C-fibers firing in me, by my fish do not have C-fibers, yet still experience pain, then the concept of pain and C-fibers firing cannot be identical. The identity theory notes this and attempts to keep the theory plausible by amending it accordingly. Instead of generalising that C-fibers firing are equal to all pains, we should restrict the theory to what pain is equal to, depending on the species we are referring to. For example, perhaps the pain of fish is recognised through Y-fibers, or the pain of snakes is recognised through T-fibers. Then we would arrive at a theory which identifies pain as follows: Pain in A equals X, pain in B equals Y and pain in C equals Z. With this in mind, multiple realizability proves a difficult critique for the identity theorist to answer. Following this, some type identity theorists have abandoned type altogether, opting for a token identity theory which allows for further introspection into specific, independent tokens of pains and not through the type identity theorists categorising and groupings of people's brain and mind states.

To conclude, whilst the mind and brain identity theory does have some considerable criticisms to answer to, more often that not, its replies to such problems are strong, allowing the theory to remain considerably plausible. One problem the theory is yet to fully answer is the question of multiple realizability. However with this being said, this should not mean we should eliminate the theory altogether, as with further discoveries in the scientific fields of neuroscience and biology we may very well be able to answer such a question helping us to further our understanding of the brain and the mind. In addition to this, whilst the theory was preceded by functionalism, it appears that if the two work together, with type identity injecting the concept of function into it's understanding of how C-fibers work, the theory could be considerably more plausible. An inclusion of functionalism would result in the identity theorist being able to defend themselves against criticisms concerning multiple realizablity, by showing that these realisations, although different in species still show to serve the same functions. Therefore whilst the identity theory remains plausible, if it were to combine the concept of functionalism into the equation it could have the potential to be almost infallible.




References

Braddon-Mitchell, David and Jackson, Frank: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition; An Introduction, (New York, Blackwell Publishing), 2007
Heil, John: Philosophy of Mind, (University States, New York, Routledge Press), 2013
Kim, Jaegwon: Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneutral Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind Second Edition, (United States, Massachusettes, Westview Press), 2006 
Ravenscrot, Ian: Philosophy of Mind, (United States, New York, Oxford University Press), 2005
http://www.iep.utm.edu/identity/ [Accessed 11th February 2017] 

Through the importance placed on moral education, virtue ethics remains a moral theory still prevalent in modern day discussions of ethics. Whilst faced with many dilemmas, it seems possible that that we all have the ability to reach the levels of reasoning phronesis requires, leading to eudaimonia. Whilst virtue ethics places much importance on characters, an individual's practice of virtues does not take place in a vacuum, but in response to the requirements of highly concrete practical situations. Understanding actions of virtue in this way enables individuals with the potential to escape bad character if it requires it: if the individual understands why she is acting virtuously, there is always potentiality to change ones character, that is not to say it is impossible. Similarly, the importance placed on moral education does not necessarily or explicitly refer to education within a family domain.

Through socialisation, by being disposed to other people's actions, we are capable of grasping what is right and what is wrong. We learn to understand virtues from almost any social environment; therefore Aristotle is capable of escaping problems arising from individuals with unfortunate upbringings. It is true such agents may exhibit bad character from being trained wrongly, however, by being disposed to further alternate, more virtuous actions of the others around them, they can reassess their understanding of what is right and wrong, rewriting their general knowledge which they derive from the specific examples of virtues witnessed.

Life of contemplation as a choice-worthy life, decision based arete, cannot be learned by reading or being taught in a classroom but requires steady practice first and theoretical study second; it can be taught therefore, but only after practice. Thinking of happiness as something capable of being taught from the offset is to conceive of the good life imperfectly; virtue is to behave in the right manner. With this in mind, we understand phronesis is concerned with particulars, focussing on how to act in specific situations. We can learn all we like in classrooms or through others, however it is only when we apply our action in the real world that we experience a working towards phronesis. We cannot foresee situations before they happen, as a result we learn from the situation we are forced into. At first, Aristotle notes it is likely we will all be liable to missing our target, however, through experience of varying circumstances, our aim gets more precise until we are able to always successfully reach our target, exemplifying practical reasoning.

This concentration on particulars plays an important part of questioning whether everyone can become phronetic and in turn, reach eudaimonia. We can only attain eudaimonia through conscious activity itself, with the realisation that eudaimonia is the good at which all other goods aim. Considering particulars further, Aristotle recognises the part fortune plays in our attainment of eudaimonia. Through our discussion of moral education we know individuals do require an element of good fortune in order  to obtain eudaimonia, as it is a constant activity and if it were to be hindered by misfortune the agent would deter from his attempts at achieving it. With this in mind, whilst Aristotle notes that eudaimonia requires sufficient good fortune, he does not recognise specifically what he means by fortune. Is it possible to create ones own fortune; through recognition of ones own well being?

Understanding fortune in this sense gives us a broader comprehension of those who can be deemed fortunate. For example, we may take for the final time, our example of the evil man. He determines his fate by his choice worthy action. There still remains potential for anyone to deter from what is to be regarded as their original character. Potentiality to realise ability to fulfil one's function as working towards the ultimate happiness is central to this understanding of fortune.

With more room for growth and the ability for the individual to branch off, discovering oneself through education and experience becomes possible. For the evil man or akratic man, both when faced with a situation, reason as if they're fighting with their emotions and immediate pleasures. Such conflict can be overcome, if one allies such feelings to reason. To lose sight of the distorting influence of pleasure, emotion and feeling is the starting point for acquiring a good reasoning faculty. Subsequently, considering potentiality and flexibility of character, whilst no easy task, I believe it to be possible for any individual to be able to lead a life of phronetic behaviour, leading to an attainment of Aristotle's final end of Eudaimonia.



References
Ackrill, John: Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in Essays in Aristotle's Ethics, Edited by Amelie Rorty, (University California Press, Los Angeles, California), 1980
Broadie, Sarah: Ethics with Aristotle, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 1991
Cooper, John: Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, (Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana), 1986
Nussbaum, Martha: The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 1986
Sherman, Nancy: The Habituation of Character in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, Edited by Nancy Sherman, (Bowman and Littlefield Publishing, Maryland, United States) 1999

Questions of moral education are prevalent as ever in modern society. To what extent can we argue there exists any definitive modern morality? We take less time to focus on morality as being taught , the way the greeks did, however is this to say we are any less aware of what is right and wrong?

The purpose of moral education is to render the irrational part of the soul amenable to autonomous rational prescription. Through acting, the non-rational part of the soul becomes receptive to reason, it listens and forms rational judgements in order to conform to the prescribed, desired action. Like we have seen through our phronesis, if I want to be more generous, it follows that I should be more giving and less selfish in my actions to attain the virtue of generosity. Such receptiveness highlights a communication between the irrational part of the soul and reason. Expressing an understanding of what is to be done and a readiness to abandon immediate pleasures in order to execute rationally arrived at by action. The non-rational part of the soul must also become reflective. Instead of being absorbed by its impulses and desires, as the akratic man is prone to, it must curb them through self discipline and reflect on decisions. One must not act through impulse but consider a practical line of action in light of his soul being receptive to reason. Such a process distinguishes the link between reason and action. To achieve an excellent character we require emotions, feeling and motives, doing the right action alone is not sufficient for moral character, we must show a contemplative structuring in our choices, leading to a forming of moral character which is dependent on each individual.

To asses whether we are all capable of practical reasoning, it seems necessary to consider agents from an early age in order to contemplate the importance of moral education. Moral training is not focussed on teaching like those who teach through words and explanations, but instead is valued through the process of habit, accepted ways of behaviour and the persistence of displaying morally virtuous habits. Whilst not naturally endowed with these habits, they are not solely the results of social interaction. Broadie notes, they should be seen as moral qualities an agent acquired through upbringing and sustains by his own practice. However, to become an agent exhibiting ethical substance we must have a sense of potentiality. Are we born with this potentiality? Do we asses our potential through upbringing? For example, the girl fed on a silver spoon has more potential from birth than the boy who unfortunately suffered beatings and abuse from a young age? Such questions beg for answers, but assessing potentiality leaves us, to some extent, in murky waters. In order to distinguish what is right we must be disposed to rightness, for example we must be disposed to just acts in order to act in a just way, act in temperance only when we have been exposed to temperate acts and so on. Potential then, is formed from being disposed to moral activities  and it is only then when we have the potential to form moral dispositions. By being disposed to moral activity we can begin to try our own hand at acting.

Through this reasoning, Aristotle makes clear that until one knows what virtue is, one cannot know how it is to be acquired. It is through being disposed to acts that we area capable of constructing our own understanding of virtuous behaviour. However, if one is not disposed to such behaviour through upbringing and being taught what is right and wrong, are we exempt from reaching phronesis? Burnyeat considers Aristotle to place great importance on our primitive materials which characters are derived from, these being the starting point which we a brought up in, recognising from a young age what justice is through learning in a 'it-is-that' sense from the conduct of others around us. For example, if I see my mother acting in a just way, like giving to those less fortunate, I can make note, my mother mentioned this is a good action, from this I will see further similar actions being performed, recognising a link between them, I become familiar with what it means to act in accordance with justice, From a sense of familiarity of specific actions the individual, with a good upbringing disposed to such actions is capable of internalising, through comparison and correlation, what are noble and fine actions.

Such guided conduct involves both being told what is noble, seeing and acknowledging what is good through action and finally, discovering that what you have been told is fine and true through ones own judgement. Discovering in this sense is to learn, not like instruction, for example to learn that 2 + 2 = 4, but to discover the reasons why certain actions are fine and good. For example, I learn that it is just to share my things with others. You must understand why the action is good, and good in itself, in order to meet to standards of reasoning phronesis requires; it is not enough to merely follow the instruction of sharing if you are doing so just because a parent has told you to. To find the reasons why you are performing such actions, to interpret it as doing good for its own sake, to make your friends happy, to realise by sharing you are all benefitting instead of just one person, is to recognise the 'because' of your action. Understanding why you have made a choice of action is an integral part of practical reasoning the individual becomes aware it is much more than just a response, but an internally recognised decision founded upon deliberation.

However, Aristotle notes it is only someone with a good upbringing who can benefit from a character well bred, as a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. Recognising moral education in this way it seems that when considering virtues, Aristotle is reluctant to allow just anyone the potential of reaching a state of practical reasoning. Touching upon fear and shame, Aristotle identifies that being disposed to nobility necessarily gives individuals a greater chance at achieving eudaimonia, for by tasting the pleasures of what is noble from a young age they understand bad acts are avoided because of shame and not fear. One mast have been disposed and educated morally to act not merely with appropriate action, but to truly understand why one acts; it is not enough to fear punishment, but as mentioned, individuals go wrong in their choices, who have been educate morally, feel shame after acting; they are aware their decision was not in accordance with virtuous behaviour and it is such an experience of shame that deters them from acting against their better judgement in future. Burnyeat makes clear Aristotle allows for failings of reason like this in individuals of young age, this is because they are still learning what is virtuous and what right decision entails, each mistake is motivating them to further their evaluative responses to situations at hand and through such a reflective scheme they are more likely to arrive at objects of nobility. However, what can be said for the man who continues to make mistakes of reason throughout adulthood? Aristotle notes that this is a likely possibility, for most peoples desires are already so corrupted, that no amount of argument will bring them to see that some things are desirable for their own sakes, leaving us doubtful as to whether we are all capable of arriving at phronesis and subsequently eudaimonia.

Stressing the educational process further, Sherman makes note that passion seems to yield not to argument, but to force, which is why those who cannot constrain their appetitive desires have underdeveloped reasoning faculties and become incapable of responding appropriately. To yield to argument requires a guiding hand, for the individual to appreciate at a young age, not the passions but the things which are good in themselves. Again, we see the importance of education and upbringing emerging, causing problems concerning those who have not had fortunate childhoods. The child, in a sense, borrows the eyes of wisdom and listens to the words of elders and the more experienced. By being disposed to different situations and perceiving what is right from such dispositions, the child sees correlations in particular circumstances, realising what is appropriate and not appropriate from watching others perform actions.

Through forming an understanding of action to circumstance in their 'this-is-that' sense, the individual from a young age can consider the particular incidents to form a general understanding of what is right and noble and what actions are wrong and should be avoided. For example, someone may accidentally stand on your foot, in which case the agent would realise the correct response would be maybe to wince in pain, but not feel anger or contempt. On the other hand, if someone went out of their way to deliberately stand on your foot, to cause pain, feeling anger would be more appropriate; naturally, someone has slighted you and purposefully gone out of their way to hurt you. Your emotional response would be justified in this way in the second example, but not the first. As a result, the individual's forming of appropriate action to circumstance arises out of the parental guidance elicited from childhood. The child mimics the action of the parent but with the additional clause of judging for oneself and feeling the appropriate emotions about what he or she chooses. Ideal action is the goal, however it is unlikely this will be achieved in the first, second or even third try; but the successive attempts and refinement of action that help us get closer to successfully arriving at the right action, as well as realising our mistakes along the way, adding to the virtue learning process. Without this training, mimicking of action displayed by those who help us learn, Aristotle seems skeptical that those with an unfortunately upbringing are capable of phronesis.

Difficulties of learning requires that the process be sweetened in various ways, with the cultivation of virtue focussed on getting better, something the individual is not born with, but arrives at through coming-to-be. Being brought up in the right ways allows agents to find enjoyment in the right things from an early age. With this in mind however, although Aristotle places great importance on moral education and upbringing, this is not to say that those who have not been brought up in such a manner are forever wretched and cannot attain phronesis. We are in agreement that the special affection children have for the family makes a privilege and effective environment for ethical learning. Yet, that is not to say that is the only environment which an individual can learn virtuous behaviour. Examples are few and far between, but are a possibility. Aristotle notes, as we have mentioned, that a changing of who we are is exceedingly difficult, but that is not to mean it is an impossibility. We cannot change our past, but we do have the potential to change our character. Although difficult, there is room for manoeuvre. Friends, work colleagues, teachers, are all capable of disposing us to a sense of what-is-rightness, through this social interaction it becomes clear that whilst a poor upbringing can infringe upon an individuals ability to achieve phronesis, there are other factors which contribute to our mimicking of action, our own judgements and subsequently our responses.



Next week we shall finalise our investigation into eudaimonia and individual's ability to attain phronetic reasoning. Taking our arguments against the egoistic problem, difficulties determining what is to be deemed voluntary and involuntary action and whether there is any scope for those with very little moral education to discover what is noble, we shall conclude whether we are to be as skeptical as Aristotle is, or if there is more potential for reaching eudaimonia than originally thought. 


References 

Broadie, Sarah: Ethics with Aristotle, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999)
Burnyeat, M: Aristotle on Learning to be Good, in Ethics with Aristotle, (University of California Press, London, England, 19980)
Crisp, Roger: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, (Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 2000)
Nussbaum, Martha: The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986)
Sherman, Nancy: The Habituation of Character in Aristotle's Ethics by Nancy Sherman, (Bowman and Littlefield Publishing, Maryland, United States, 1999)