Questions of moral education are prevalent as ever in modern society. To what extent can we argue there exists any definitive modern morality? We take less time to focus on morality as being taught , the way the greeks did, however is this to say we are any less aware of what is right and wrong?

The purpose of moral education is to render the irrational part of the soul amenable to autonomous rational prescription. Through acting, the non-rational part of the soul becomes receptive to reason, it listens and forms rational judgements in order to conform to the prescribed, desired action. Like we have seen through our phronesis, if I want to be more generous, it follows that I should be more giving and less selfish in my actions to attain the virtue of generosity. Such receptiveness highlights a communication between the irrational part of the soul and reason. Expressing an understanding of what is to be done and a readiness to abandon immediate pleasures in order to execute rationally arrived at by action. The non-rational part of the soul must also become reflective. Instead of being absorbed by its impulses and desires, as the akratic man is prone to, it must curb them through self discipline and reflect on decisions. One must not act through impulse but consider a practical line of action in light of his soul being receptive to reason. Such a process distinguishes the link between reason and action. To achieve an excellent character we require emotions, feeling and motives, doing the right action alone is not sufficient for moral character, we must show a contemplative structuring in our choices, leading to a forming of moral character which is dependent on each individual.

To asses whether we are all capable of practical reasoning, it seems necessary to consider agents from an early age in order to contemplate the importance of moral education. Moral training is not focussed on teaching like those who teach through words and explanations, but instead is valued through the process of habit, accepted ways of behaviour and the persistence of displaying morally virtuous habits. Whilst not naturally endowed with these habits, they are not solely the results of social interaction. Broadie notes, they should be seen as moral qualities an agent acquired through upbringing and sustains by his own practice. However, to become an agent exhibiting ethical substance we must have a sense of potentiality. Are we born with this potentiality? Do we asses our potential through upbringing? For example, the girl fed on a silver spoon has more potential from birth than the boy who unfortunately suffered beatings and abuse from a young age? Such questions beg for answers, but assessing potentiality leaves us, to some extent, in murky waters. In order to distinguish what is right we must be disposed to rightness, for example we must be disposed to just acts in order to act in a just way, act in temperance only when we have been exposed to temperate acts and so on. Potential then, is formed from being disposed to moral activities  and it is only then when we have the potential to form moral dispositions. By being disposed to moral activity we can begin to try our own hand at acting.

Through this reasoning, Aristotle makes clear that until one knows what virtue is, one cannot know how it is to be acquired. It is through being disposed to acts that we area capable of constructing our own understanding of virtuous behaviour. However, if one is not disposed to such behaviour through upbringing and being taught what is right and wrong, are we exempt from reaching phronesis? Burnyeat considers Aristotle to place great importance on our primitive materials which characters are derived from, these being the starting point which we a brought up in, recognising from a young age what justice is through learning in a 'it-is-that' sense from the conduct of others around us. For example, if I see my mother acting in a just way, like giving to those less fortunate, I can make note, my mother mentioned this is a good action, from this I will see further similar actions being performed, recognising a link between them, I become familiar with what it means to act in accordance with justice, From a sense of familiarity of specific actions the individual, with a good upbringing disposed to such actions is capable of internalising, through comparison and correlation, what are noble and fine actions.

Such guided conduct involves both being told what is noble, seeing and acknowledging what is good through action and finally, discovering that what you have been told is fine and true through ones own judgement. Discovering in this sense is to learn, not like instruction, for example to learn that 2 + 2 = 4, but to discover the reasons why certain actions are fine and good. For example, I learn that it is just to share my things with others. You must understand why the action is good, and good in itself, in order to meet to standards of reasoning phronesis requires; it is not enough to merely follow the instruction of sharing if you are doing so just because a parent has told you to. To find the reasons why you are performing such actions, to interpret it as doing good for its own sake, to make your friends happy, to realise by sharing you are all benefitting instead of just one person, is to recognise the 'because' of your action. Understanding why you have made a choice of action is an integral part of practical reasoning the individual becomes aware it is much more than just a response, but an internally recognised decision founded upon deliberation.

However, Aristotle notes it is only someone with a good upbringing who can benefit from a character well bred, as a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. Recognising moral education in this way it seems that when considering virtues, Aristotle is reluctant to allow just anyone the potential of reaching a state of practical reasoning. Touching upon fear and shame, Aristotle identifies that being disposed to nobility necessarily gives individuals a greater chance at achieving eudaimonia, for by tasting the pleasures of what is noble from a young age they understand bad acts are avoided because of shame and not fear. One mast have been disposed and educated morally to act not merely with appropriate action, but to truly understand why one acts; it is not enough to fear punishment, but as mentioned, individuals go wrong in their choices, who have been educate morally, feel shame after acting; they are aware their decision was not in accordance with virtuous behaviour and it is such an experience of shame that deters them from acting against their better judgement in future. Burnyeat makes clear Aristotle allows for failings of reason like this in individuals of young age, this is because they are still learning what is virtuous and what right decision entails, each mistake is motivating them to further their evaluative responses to situations at hand and through such a reflective scheme they are more likely to arrive at objects of nobility. However, what can be said for the man who continues to make mistakes of reason throughout adulthood? Aristotle notes that this is a likely possibility, for most peoples desires are already so corrupted, that no amount of argument will bring them to see that some things are desirable for their own sakes, leaving us doubtful as to whether we are all capable of arriving at phronesis and subsequently eudaimonia.

Stressing the educational process further, Sherman makes note that passion seems to yield not to argument, but to force, which is why those who cannot constrain their appetitive desires have underdeveloped reasoning faculties and become incapable of responding appropriately. To yield to argument requires a guiding hand, for the individual to appreciate at a young age, not the passions but the things which are good in themselves. Again, we see the importance of education and upbringing emerging, causing problems concerning those who have not had fortunate childhoods. The child, in a sense, borrows the eyes of wisdom and listens to the words of elders and the more experienced. By being disposed to different situations and perceiving what is right from such dispositions, the child sees correlations in particular circumstances, realising what is appropriate and not appropriate from watching others perform actions.

Through forming an understanding of action to circumstance in their 'this-is-that' sense, the individual from a young age can consider the particular incidents to form a general understanding of what is right and noble and what actions are wrong and should be avoided. For example, someone may accidentally stand on your foot, in which case the agent would realise the correct response would be maybe to wince in pain, but not feel anger or contempt. On the other hand, if someone went out of their way to deliberately stand on your foot, to cause pain, feeling anger would be more appropriate; naturally, someone has slighted you and purposefully gone out of their way to hurt you. Your emotional response would be justified in this way in the second example, but not the first. As a result, the individual's forming of appropriate action to circumstance arises out of the parental guidance elicited from childhood. The child mimics the action of the parent but with the additional clause of judging for oneself and feeling the appropriate emotions about what he or she chooses. Ideal action is the goal, however it is unlikely this will be achieved in the first, second or even third try; but the successive attempts and refinement of action that help us get closer to successfully arriving at the right action, as well as realising our mistakes along the way, adding to the virtue learning process. Without this training, mimicking of action displayed by those who help us learn, Aristotle seems skeptical that those with an unfortunately upbringing are capable of phronesis.

Difficulties of learning requires that the process be sweetened in various ways, with the cultivation of virtue focussed on getting better, something the individual is not born with, but arrives at through coming-to-be. Being brought up in the right ways allows agents to find enjoyment in the right things from an early age. With this in mind however, although Aristotle places great importance on moral education and upbringing, this is not to say that those who have not been brought up in such a manner are forever wretched and cannot attain phronesis. We are in agreement that the special affection children have for the family makes a privilege and effective environment for ethical learning. Yet, that is not to say that is the only environment which an individual can learn virtuous behaviour. Examples are few and far between, but are a possibility. Aristotle notes, as we have mentioned, that a changing of who we are is exceedingly difficult, but that is not to mean it is an impossibility. We cannot change our past, but we do have the potential to change our character. Although difficult, there is room for manoeuvre. Friends, work colleagues, teachers, are all capable of disposing us to a sense of what-is-rightness, through this social interaction it becomes clear that whilst a poor upbringing can infringe upon an individuals ability to achieve phronesis, there are other factors which contribute to our mimicking of action, our own judgements and subsequently our responses.



Next week we shall finalise our investigation into eudaimonia and individual's ability to attain phronetic reasoning. Taking our arguments against the egoistic problem, difficulties determining what is to be deemed voluntary and involuntary action and whether there is any scope for those with very little moral education to discover what is noble, we shall conclude whether we are to be as skeptical as Aristotle is, or if there is more potential for reaching eudaimonia than originally thought. 


References 

Broadie, Sarah: Ethics with Aristotle, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999)
Burnyeat, M: Aristotle on Learning to be Good, in Ethics with Aristotle, (University of California Press, London, England, 19980)
Crisp, Roger: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, (Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 2000)
Nussbaum, Martha: The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986)
Sherman, Nancy: The Habituation of Character in Aristotle's Ethics by Nancy Sherman, (Bowman and Littlefield Publishing, Maryland, United States, 1999)

Considering my last post I beg to question whether we can really render the evil individual as voluntary? Aristotle in chapter 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics considers actions done involuntarily.  He explains the man who acts involuntarily, who doesn't act in accordance with justice or injustice but incidentally, is participating in non voluntary action and 'non-voluntary' should be used as a term coined 'for all actions done under ignorance'. Despite this, Aristotle believes we should still consider evil as that of choice and voluntary.

Initially, the actions which formed his evil dispositions were performed through the corresponding character, over time they have become almost second nature. The agent once had the potential to do otherwise, to choose his own action, through choice. Two main things render actions involuntary, these are force and ignorance. Force is concerned with both psychological pressures and physical forces. Acting out of psychological pressure may be to act out of threat of pain or punishment; for example, if Bob does not own up he will be tortured. Alternatively, an example of physical force may be, if Bob's bus stops to a halt, he accidentally spills coffee on the passenger next to him; the spilling is involuntary, caused by the force of the bus driver braking. Being forced to act is concerned with pressure, in this way, we naturally do not associate it with what is good or pleasant, but rather, when we act involuntarily in this way we experience both regret and pain. Considering regret and pain, we must not confuse involuntary forced action with actions which we do, yet don't want to do. Giving up your seat on the tube so someone else can sit down is voluntary. Why? This is an action we do to secure a good end, we value it as a right action to choose. Such an action is praised, it is the praise associated with the action which highlights its status as voluntary; as actions which are involuntary often do not have praise and blame attached to them. It is therefore the moment of action and the circumstances an agent is in we are concerned with in cases of voluntary versus non-voluntary status and not whether an action is genuinely desirable.

Following this, the second element of involuntary action is ignorance. Acting from ignorance is again, a matter of the individuals circumstances. To act from ignorance is not to know the consequences, or in what manner you are acting. However, you are aware of the general truths at hand, and what you are aiming for in respect of your desired end. For example, you may want to make your friend happy after her breakup with her boyfriend. Your desired end is to make her feel better, however you might think you are helping her by talking to her, trying to console her, encouraging her to get back on the dating scene, when in actual fact you may be annoying or even hindering her more as she would prefer to be at home, alone and crying at Bridget Jones. Your action becomes involuntary as your ignorance of her wishes and the manner in which you are acting is not actually favourable to the end in which you are aiming for. Therefore those who act from ignorance are not fully aware of the way in which their actions are performed towards specific consequences, they are acting willingly however the action in question does not suffice the ends they attempt to meet.

Voluntary action, in contrast, is action brought about with the knowledge of what you are doing. Whilst some say actions from passion are not voluntary, I think this is mistaken. If it were true that acting through emotion or passion was not voluntary, both children and animals would cease to be voluntary. Furthermore, there are many good actions which arise from passion and emotion, which we ought to do, to render them not voluntary would seem unfair. My desires and emotions should not be seen as less a part of me than mere reason. Acting on them is natural, something which we often do and should have just as much importance placed on them. To be a voluntary agent is to be one who is knowledgable of where his action arises from, to be answerable to ones own choices and deliberations. Considering choice, we must consider the difference between what is voluntary and what we choose. All that we choose to do is voluntary, but it is not the case that everything voluntary is chosen. For example, my three year old niece Amelia acts voluntarily, but her action is not chosen in the sense we understand choice. So then how are we to define choice? Aristotle values choice not necessarily as someone who goes against their desire, resisting temptation, nor is it wishing, but instead, a practical decision of means to arrive at a specific end.

Choice is distinguished as deliberation, concerned with things we can change (unlike facts like the eiffel tower is 300 metres tall), deliberation is, as we noted through our evaluation of phronesis, a reasoned thought process concerned with intuition and action, applied differently dependent on different occasions. It is true, as Aristotle notes, that we deliberate only about the means and not about specific ends. At first this seems difficult to accept, for example I may study hard, for the end of getting a good grade. However my choice to study is party of a much wider thought process than the immediate grading of an essay, it associates itself with my desired final end. My good grades would be part of the greater end of wishing to be a well educated individual, to learn more, to teach others what I have learnt, to display flourishing and work towards a good life. Through deliberation we understand choice, as things which are knowingly in ones power.

Returning to our example of the evil man we can now consider whether people do bad things voluntarily as well as by choice. Prior to Aristotle, Socrates argued everyone aims at what they consider good, anything bad which is done is done through ignorance of what truly good action is and therefore cannot be voluntary. Aristotle agreed to some extent, that bad people are ignorant of what is good, however their action is still voluntary. Choosing a right act requires understanding the reason why it is right. The bad or evil man may be aware that an action should not be done, however if he cannot realise why, he does not know what he is ought to do. Speaking of proper goods, Aristotle notes we must aim at what is truly desirable to arrive at eudaimonia, what a good person desires, but not what the akratic man or ignorant man would desire. Pleasure infringes on the understanding of good and leads to pursing the bad as it is assumed to be most desirable and pleasant.

It is true that different characters find pleasures in different things, however this is not a scapegoat for allowing involuntary actions of the wretched. Aristotle notes this is because (as already mentioned), choice relates to what is in our power to do. We choose whether we do good or bad actions; therefore evil people choose bad actions voluntarily. Bad actions are discouraged at the same time as encouragement of acting within our power, like choosing and judging. Therefore, bad actions must be done voluntarily. But are the bad still morally responsible? They may truly believe they are choosing what they think is good, unaware of what is desirable for its own sake, acting from ignorance. Aristotle accepts this is the process which they do arrive at their decisions by, but are nevertheless, still responsible for their actions. Bad people are bad as a result of bad choices, they become bad on their own accord through constant bad actions they become more and more ignorant of goodness. Forming ones character is acquired through acting in a corresponding way. We choose how to act and such choices in turn, result in making us good or bad agents.

Actions and character traits, it is important we note, are not values and subsequently are also not voluntary in the same way. Voluntary actions are under our control from beginning to end, we make a choice and act upon it. Traits of character like those we explored in the last post however, are developed at the beginning, by choosing action, we create traits of character, therefore our gradual accumulation of actions of choice lead us to become a certain sort of person, once we become such a person we cannot simply choose to be any different. Therefore, it is through the separation of the two that we can arrive at understanding how the evil individuals actions are done voluntarily, and what once was a flexible character, has now become fixed through a constant state of bad decision making. It is through such reasoning that the individual can be considered voluntary, with a flexible character, and still be answerable to his own actions.

However this still leaves us with many questions. When is an individual entrenched in evilness and when does the wrongdoing become so much a part of his nature that evilness is inseparable from his character? Is there a turning point in the process where we identify what is good and that which is evil? A line which once crossed, leaves no room for escapism? I am prone to think this all seems unlikely, but then again, I am often prone to rose-tinting and romanticising the image of human nature.




My next post will consider moral education as a solution to all that is non-rational, evil, akratic and weak-willed. Addressing whether there really is any scope for millennial's to truly be morally educated, or whether the entire concept is anachronistic in nature and can solve very little in modern society. 

Often, when faced with practical reason, questions regarding moral character arise, the most crucial of which being whether moral character is to be rendered fixed or flexible. If it is a case of the former it seems impossible that everyone is capable of practical reasoning. Those who cannot reason well like the akratic man or the man who was brought up disposed to bad decision making will have this decision making rooted in their character, leaving no ability for them to escape their flawed choices. On the other hand, if our moral characters are flexible, it seems possible even those who have done wrong or are prone to ill-decision making, are capable of reaching practical wisdom and displaying excellent moral character.

Aristotle argues we all begin life with no determinate character, however, some seem to have natural endowments, by nature one may have discernment, judgement and intellect in knowing what is greatest and most noble. Such a character cannot be learnt, but arises from birth. However, blurring this conception of character Aristotle questions if moral character and moral values were not to be innate, if individuals were to be naturally endowed, why would excellence be valued more than badness? If this is the case, it seems as if happiness is in the end a matter of fortune and not at all up to us, even if we did our virtuous best. Would there be any reason why we should try to be good? If we were stuck in a state of bad moral character, we would be wasting our time and efforts in attempting escape to goodness. Such conflicting statements give rise to questions of an agents free will, leaving us in great danger when faced with the question of practical wisdom's attainment. Does Aristotle believe some are more capable than others, allowing for biases in the potential development of individuals, or does he assert that acquisition of character is voluntary through our own choosing, acting and upbringing?

If moral character were fixed, it seems that no matter how hard someone may try to understand the concept of justice, or perform just acts, if its not in their character to associate justice with goodness, they would not be capable of practicing such a virtue. Not just limiting in this since, an even more alarming problem arises as a consequence of considering moral character as innate. If such characteristics were determined, no one could be blamed for wrongdoing, nor held accountable for their good actions. Surely Aristotle would agree this seems unfair to relieve blame from those who have done evil, or in contrast, to not praise those who act with a great deal of selflessness and goodness? By analogy, 'medicine is not in control of health. For it does not make use of health, but provides for healths coming into being', just like medicine is not in control of health, our character is not fully in control of our practical wisdom capabilities. Reminding us to place a great importance on our ability to be educated morally, we can tune into our characters, allowing us to use our character as a springboard helping with our coming into being, sometimes diverting from the original character and develop accordingly. Much meaning is to be found in our childhoods, as our character starts developing in the young through being encouraged to voluntarily do and refrain from certain things, ensuring character results from voluntary action. What is more, is that only an utterly unmindful person is unaware of the fact that by pursing certain lines of conduct we come to be such as to act in specific ways. Those who do tend to appeal to their acting as being 'part of their nature'.

To reason in accordance to ones nature is to be too lazy to change and show no willingness to alter ones own character. To clarify further, Aristotle makes clear what is meant by character and how it can sometimes depend on our action to evolve our character accordingly. Let us consider the man who is always late. He holds the view that because he os always late, it is in his character to act in such a way, however what he does not note is that it is his choice to act in such a way. He chooses action which adheres to his natural inclination of tardiness. However, this doesn't have to be the case, through the practice of moral education, if an individual develops a certain moral character, which was natural for him to develop, then so too is it possible for him to also develop a significantly different character. Initially this seems to go against the argument of fixed characters, however when we consider the approach as we do with the golden mean, we come to realise that it is possible to do both; to be inclined, to be of a certain moral character and yet also voluntarily choose ones character. The golden mean is an individuals ability to choose a middle path of action in accordance with ones own decisions and excesses. Why can't we consider character in a similar way? Our man who is incapable of being on time, may be inclined naturally to be late due to poor time keeping. However, this does not mean he has to act in such a way, only that he currently chooses the option which is easiest for him. If willing to, he could act in respect of his potency, to listen to the rational part of his soul and voluntarily choose to focus on bettering himself, on working on his deficiency of lateness.

If this means people have the potential to choose their moral characteristics, how can there be so little room for change and manoeuvre in the evil individuals disposition? For Aristotle, the evil man is objectively wretched as he he 'ethically bent'. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for the man who is evil to feel trapped by his own nature, to some extent he shows clear signs of self-hatred because he does, which to be just in his ways. Broadie distinguishes why this is troubling as she states 'this underscores the lack of freedom, which leads us to question their status as voluntary agents'. It is important we continue to understand Aristotle's approach to our character as voluntary. Virtue and vice still stand as those which are up to us, vice therefore is an action which is decided upon and chosen willingly by the individual to change and choose virtue. Aristotle is doubtful. If brought up, educated or habituated into acquiring bad habits, naturally an agent becomes lenient to deciding on the wrong things, although not deliberately decided on the choice of being unhappy. They are more likely to do things they ought to avoid, due to being habituated in such a way, after such habits are formed, comes the time when it becomes difficult for the evil wrongdoer to escape his own disposition for one more virtuous. He becomes unable to choose the right things, the same way poor health can be a consequence of choices made in the past, in a sense bad decisions become a sort of self-mutilation. The same way a person may develop cancer from smoking or drinking, they lack an exercise of restraint, suffering from their past choices as a result, so too does the man of evil character.

The conditions which were once voluntary, through habit, become increasingly difficult to break. The individual remains a practical being and may way and wish for nothing more than to be a different way, but he knows no other way to be, he cannot think of a practical alternative, because he has been so prone to neglecting and not exercising his rational part of the soul, he becomes trapped by his passions and impulsive behaviour. As a result, reaching eudaimonia looks like an impossible task as the agent becomes entrenched in bad habits and imprisoned by his own choices. We are left wondering, is an escape route possible for everyone?




Next week we shall asses whether we really are as voluntary to action as we like to believe we are, or whether there exists an underlying deterministic reality from which our action arises.


References 

Due to its value as seeking of the greatest happiness, Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia has been under attack by some who regard it in its very definition, egoistic. Supporters of such a stance believe advocates of eudaimonia are either illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle's discredited natural theology or producing mere rationalisations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. The question posed is whether Aristotle's concept of happiness understood as everyone pursuing their own happiness eventually ends up in what Irwin best identifies as 'useless triviality, saying that people desire most whatever they desire most'. Are we on the right track by comprehending eudaimonia this way? I am dubious.

To believe ultimate happiness revolves around desires is to remove all morality from the very moral concept it is identified as. Eudaimonia is concerned with flourishing in addition to happiness and most importantly, motives for happiness themselves constitute towards our telos of final, ultimate happiness. Advocating the idea that humans are by nature social animals, Aristotle understands that both the psychology and evolution of humans show how dependent on each other we are. We choose to live together, work together and engage with one another. We could live as hermits, secluding ourselves to achieve these egoistic aims, however, we give them up. We volunteer ourselves to cooperation in a society. Our necessitating of a society does not mean we rely on natural impulses solely directed towards our own independent desires, but acknowledging action in respect of the society and communities we are a part of, action arises from altruism and recognition. To argue that a virtuous agent would act on the basis of doing something just because she wants to, is to be confused about the concept of eudaimonia. The individual does not act through selfishness, instead she acts because she thinks her action will result in the best outcome of a situation, such as someones suffering being avoided, someone benefitting from a  situation where they otherwise would not have, were her action to be different to the one she performed. The virtuous individual concentrates on these reasons for acting, not because she believes acting in a specific way will get her closer to eudaimonia, but through striving for happiness as flourishing, thus leaving all arguments concerning egocentric aims redundant.

Central to the our proper idea of eudaimonia is our ability to reason well. Those we can reason well are exhibiting their ability to make rationalised practical decisions, eventually leading to skilful phronetic behaviour, choice and action. Necessary in our understanding of eudaimonia is an inner consideration of what is right. To act because it is what we want is not enough to justify our actions, we need reason which must be good in itself. For an agent to do what they want is to act from impulse, passion and desire, like the akratic individuals discussed, they do not take time to deliberate and consider their reasoning faculties. Subsequently, they prevent the full development in themselves of certain desires, which would allow them to grow and realise their telos. To exercise ones virtues, eudaimonia is naturally to be partially constitutive when making decisions and acting, however this is not to mean that it is all the individual is geared towards; he must judge for himself the best course of action, not only for the fundamental aim of flourishing, but to truly value the actions which lead to him arriving at it. A life successfully lived, one of contemplation requires individuals to act altruistically not in a means to end self-centred way, but through an evaluative process of reasoning.

The egocentric individual is aware of his minor premise however they cannot make the connections to the further major premise. For example consider I have a friend named Ken who gets talking with an attractive lady at his bus stop, after talking for a few minutes he discovers she is married, but also, flirting with him. He knows adultery is wrong, but at the same time believes she is attracted to him. The man who can identify the minor premise of action then and there in accordance with his major premise of eudaimonia and the good life, recognises it is in his best interests to end the conversation, walk away, act in a way which would not tread on the toes of the man married to the flirtatious bus-waiting lady. However, the akratic man cannot make this connection, instead he may catch the same bus to spend extra time getting to know her, his passions leading him down the possible path of contributing to the woman's act of adultery. As a result, it is only those who are unaware of the highest, overarching premise and it's contribution to action central to eudaimonia, who can be deemed egoistic.

Acting with only the minor premise, in a manner with focusses on action as usefulness to ones own aims, is egocentric. Individuals who do so do not asses whether their action leads to the greatest goodness, happiness. They are only committed to what satisfies their immediate needs, not aware of their self-sufficency acting with so much passion they infringe upon their own ability to reach the highest good, hindering themselves and their own ability to reach phronesis. The difference then, between the agent displaying virtuous behaviour and the akratic individual is that the former acts a result of what he believes he should do, whereas the individual who is akratic in his decisions merely acts because it is what he desires and is pleasured by. Those who display virtue act in this way even if it means the situation is not favourable for them. For example they give to charity even if it means they cannot spend the money on a drink with friends at the bar, this is because they are aware the same amount would mean more to the charity than it would were it to be wasted away at the bar. This sense of other-regarding as opposed to self-regarding is central to our understanding of eudaimonia, the benevolence and justice inherent in such actions make them anything but egocentric. As a result, it seems that to render the process of eudaimonia as egocentric is to misunderstand eudaimonia and its requirements; the virtuous individual is not egocentric but altruistic, other regarding and takes great time in reasoning well so that their actions are justified and virtuous in their own right.



But what about if an individual is intrinsically prone to more egocentric action than most agents? Is this a possibility, is there room for change in ones nature? Next time we shall investigate as to whether character is to be valued as fixed or flexible.



References

Cooper, John: Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, (Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1986)
Crisp, Roger: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000)
Irwin, Terence: The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's Ethics in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (University Press California, London, 1980)
Mele, Alfred: Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia and the Psychological Action of Aristotle's Ethics, Edited by Nancy Sherman, (Bowman and Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, United States, 1999)
Nussbaum, Martha: The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986)
Ross, David: The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013)
Williams, Bernard: Justice as Virtue, in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981)

With virtues in mind, an inability to reason properly, to ignore the extremes and remain ignorant to our own deficiencies can result in giving rise to akrasia. Akrasia is exemplified when individuals are prone to act against their better judgement through weakness of will. Habituation and upbringing are stressed to the fullest extent when we consider the akratic man, as he chooses badly through his inability to reason towards eudaimonia and the highest good. Instead he is ruined by pleasure or pain as he only seeks out what is pleasant and good as it appears to be (orexis), not for the overarching good. For example, let us take our example last time of Donald Trump. There is no denying he is greedy, he reasons non-rational to obtain an excessive amount, be it money, fame or publicity. Trump exhibits the opposite of what practical reasoning teaches us through deliberation. Those who act from orexis are tied down by their non-rational desires, with no organisation or structure, opting for apparent goods as their strong desire for the instantaneously pleasurable overrides their capacity to think rationally, as they experience a mental struggle between reason and passion.

Failing to understand phronesis through no experiences of the truly good, the akratic or weak willed person fails to put his wish of a flourishing life first to choose the truly good and not the mere pleasurable. In an akratic state, his desires are not enough for him to feel motivated to act correspondingly with his ethical knowledge. Instead he acts, as Aristotle notes, as if he were mad or drunk. Incapable of utilising practicality, his reasoning becomes corrupted by vile pleasures, which add nothing to his flourishing. As a result, it is through such corruption that the individual becomes victim to choosing the wrong pleasures by means of habit. Choosing wrongly through a lack of experience of what is noble and fine means they have no conception of what is noble. The akratic mind finds it difficult to even comprehend the most base understandings of virtues, finding great difficulty in deciding between rational and non-rational decisions. We begin to see the complications of Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia and the skill of practical reason; for if we have no experienced it, how are we to know choosing what is good is better than choosing what is pleasurable? If we have begun from an early age, to form such bad habits, do we have any real chance of escaping them and in turn being capable of forming more virtues ones in their place?

In stark contrast, individuals who have acquired the skill of phronesis are aware that 'both the reasoning must be true and the desire right if the choice is to be good. Choosing something which is both good in itself and aims at eudaimonia is choosing what is truly good, leading to phronesis. Individuals who act in such a way have a true and reasoned state of capacity, to act with regards to the things which are both good and bad for man. Striving for what is truly good for oneself and the best means to his complete end, the man of phronesis reflects of his decisions.  But what motivates him to act and deviate from the noble and fine is his awareness of guilt and shame. Unlike the akratic man, he is aware that choosing what is solely pleasurable in its nature leads to feelings like shame. He must continue his reflective reasoning as he is aware that such a state of akrasia can be forgotten, but practical wisdom cannot. Non-rational action is acting against ones better judgement, the man who reasons rationally feels wrongdoing, regretting decisions when they're passion based. Such regret following the non-rational has repercussions, synonymous with his guilt and shame of why he shouldn't act in the same way again. Through acting with non-rational motives he becomes aware he is only choosing as a means to an end rather than reflectively considering all that is actually good. When the individual accomplishes practical reason, they are no longer afraid of punishment, but the shame which arises from lack to deliberation in their decision.

Through shame, duty naturally emerges for men are 'responsible for themselves, for being unjust or self-indulgent', their ability to make choices means individuals are morally obliged to recognise what is noble and pleasurable intrinsically from the habits which they have formed. Constant structuring and ordering of this part of the soul, as well as training to correct passional response are necessary to achieve practical reasoning. Therefore it is through habituation that an individual is able to comprehend the noble, diverting him from a desire to seek out pleasure. He is lead following this comprehension of what is truly good to form baseness which he can flourish from as he becomes acquainted with an aspiration to seek out good and avoid shame at all costs.

However, is this aspiration possible for someone who has not yet established a baseness of ethical action? How can the man who has no conception of core and base right action consciously avoid the emotional aftershock of choosing wrongly if he still associates bad action with being in trouble instead of shame and feelings of guilt and remorse? As a result, before he can aspire to avoid shame his construed perception of goodness and choice must be corrected. With his views embedded in his action, the difficulty of rectifying the agent's understanding cannot be stressed enough. Is this a difficult task, or an impossible one?



We shall consider this in further detail in the forthcoming weeks. Adding to this distorted view of what is right and wrong, next week we shall dive into what is known as the egoistic problem. 


References 


Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Edited by Roger Crisp, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000)
Burnyeat, M. F: Aristotle on Learning to be Good in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Edited by Amelie Rorty, (University of California Press, Los Angeles, California, 1980)
Nussbaum, Martha: The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986)
Ross, David: The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013)
Williams, Bernard: Justice as Virtue in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981)

In Aristotelian ethics, all human action aims at some end that we value as good. Such an end brings us closer to our final end of eudaimonia, a happiness aimed at for it's own sake, not for some other alternate end. Such happiness should relate to the characteristic activity and exercise of potentialities whose actualisation constitutes as our function of human life. In other words, for happiness and goodness to coincide, it is important we recognise the term ergon as a type of good reasoning found in our decision making process, the rational aspect of us in accordance with virtue. With virtuous action being noted as those which are praiseworthy, or whatever is good is pleasurable because it is good, we recognise there is much value to be recognised in the decision making process of virtuous choice.

The man who chooses good by reconciling his decision with the worth it will bring to his final happiness is aware of the ergon he exhibits. In contrast, the man who chooses with immediacy bases what he chooses on impulse, on what he wants and desires at that moment, with no acknowledgement of his future or final happiness. It is true that choosing rightly is not a task easily undertaken, individuals exhibit many defaults through weak rationality, and limitations derived from poor moral education and pure luck. Even still, there remains greater respect, obvious in society, for the man who chooses rightly, who is capable of reasoning practically. Aristotle is doubtful whether we are all able to attain the capacity to live this way. I am more optimistic about our potentiality, although I still often find myself wondering whether, even if we could live in this way, whether we really should do so.

Divided into seven parts, this is the first of an investigation into individual's abilities to reach Aristotle's concept of Eudaimonia, assessing whether every individual is capable of practical wisdom by considering a series of case studies. From the akratic (weak willed) man, to the man of utmost virtuous behaviour I will consider whether upbringing, moral education and luck affect a person's ability to be rendered virtuous. Following this, conceptualising voluntary and non-voluntary decision making processes of reasoning I shall address the psychology surrounding virtue and moral responsibility, to evaluate if an agent's temperament and character is fixed, or has some flexibility for change. In light of all of this, we shall turn to our original question, of whether all individuals can reach eudaimonia through practice of phronesis, whether certain individuals remain stuck with an inability to progress to this happiness, or whether there is more to lose than gain by living in accordance with the concept of eudaimonia.

The Basics of Action and Virtue

Actions chosen for their own sakes have intrinsic value, they're chosen through deliberation and deliver an expression of a person's character. However, decision making in this way does not come easily to everyone, in fact it is a rare occurrence to be born with a reasoning faculty of such precedence and calibre. It is through constant habituation and experience that one is likely to recognise good reasoning and subsequently arrive at reasoning in this way. Through empirical despondence with reference to our own independent motives, emotions and acknowledging our own deficiencies, we can then learn to evaluate and conclude at what is to be valued virtuous excellence of character, geared towards eudaimonia. Answering with reference to ourselves leaves us in a better position to consider what is best for us, it is subjective and subjectivity is not without its problems, which we shall later address, however by utilising this individuality we lose sight of a concept of eudaimonia which may be too impartial.

Identifying the right paths of action, aiming at our own individual comprehension of the golden mean, coming to a middle ground formulated by what we, as individuals, understand our final end to be. We comprise a second nature ability to remember to not go to excess, or not to exhibit deficiency in certain virtues. Such a process highlights not only the importance of practical reasoning, but also leaves many questions as to whether everyone is capable of achieving this type of reasoning. Does everyone know not to go to excess? To make choices by utilising our rationality and avoid compulsion, can often seem like a difficult task, but it remains central to Aristotle's concept of a flourishing self-sufficent life, formed upon exercising right reason and appropriate action.

To reason in practical manner is to be adhering to Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom. our reason behind wanting to exhibit phronesis is eudaimonia, our ultimate end and completion of activity as human beings, an activity of a soul exhibiting excellence. Excellence so great is identified as arete ethike. Concerned with the character of individuals, it values virtues such as courage, justice and temperance. An appreciation of such virtues is what lays the foundations of a flourishing life, as we establish what is virtuous and non-virtuous. Decision making in accordance with our final end must abide by the rule that actions must be self-sufficient and overcome our desires. Desires, if part of attaining eudaimonia, must be desired for themselves, not for anything else. We learn how all of our desires depend on our leading, single and ultimate desire of eudaimonia. Through engagement with the final telos we can appreciate why we reason towards this conception of human flourishing. Maybe we are not to see eudaimonia as a distinct means to a specific end?

Imagine someone who takes pride in gaining as much money as possible, whatever the moral cost. An extreme form of greediness for possessions, money and wealth, identified in greek terminology as pleonexia. Due to his current relevance lets consider Donald Trump as someone who exemplifies pleonexia well. To him, everything relies on this end, so much that all his desires revolve around obtaining as much money as possible. He will be kind hearted and giving, he may say all the right things, but not because he believes it to be just and fair, not because he understands it as the right thing in itself, but for the sake of something else, namely, an overriding desire of greed. Eudaimonia should never be seen in this way, not a quick means to an end, but a goal which is forever in constant view, one which we remain aware of in all decision making. Over time it becomes second nature to act in accordance with it, but like everything, virtue requires practice before it is perfect. Valued as an object of pursuit which we desire for itself, yet inherent in all other things, it is not like obtainment of the material kind (either we have it or we don't), but more through development and exercise of ones capacity for theoretical activity, that it is acquired.  It is only through contemplation, investigation and applying theoretical action as intellectual excellence in accordance with the situation at hand that one comes closer to the target of eudaimonia.

But why are certain things 'good' and what things are 'good'?

For Aristotle, things which are rational are good, they are rational because they are based upon the principle of doing what is most likely to promote a good end. Individuals who can do so, understand this practical reasoning demonstrating phronesis. In contrast, non-rational desires do not encompass a reflective reasoning in such a way. Instead, they're based upon feelings and appetitive desires. Donald Trump and his pleonexy highlight how individuals accustomed to choosing non-rationaly central their aims to the pleasurable, solely because it is pleasurable in a primitive way, acting from basic human nature and not through learned reasoning. Taking a more basic example, a choice I know I am often met with at work. Lunchtime decisions. Cake? No cake? I know what is healthy and right for me, five a day, the food diagram blah blah. If I choose through pleasure and basic human nature I will become devoid of all this knowledge surrounding healthy life-choices and opt for cake. All in an impulsive, most pleasure-satisfying form of thought. However, if I reflect, as Aristotle believes I should, adding to my lunchtime considerations of what I think is truly good, with reference to my overarching aim of leading a healthy life, I choose something else. Perhaps pasta and a side salad? Such a choice makes reference to rational reflection and a final aim. Aligning what is pleasurable appetitively and what is really good comes from practice of the non-rational element being persuaded by rational principle.

Importance placed on the end being fixed and through the use of the analogy 'a doctor does not deliberate whether to heal', Aristotle identifies the inherent pursuit of happiness in all of us, noting we deliberate not about ends, but about the means of arriving at it. A virtuous man is not virtuous through nature, but from habit. Being disposed to behave in the right ways, for the right reasons results in feeling pleasure when acting in accordance with rightness. To determine what is right and wrong, we look to passion in decision making. Passion is felt when we desire things. A desire for an excess of money which we do not necessarily need is understood as greed, it doesn't add anything to our end of eudaimonia as it remains a passion built upon through what is appetitive in us. Those of virtue do not act appetitively, but instead acts through reasoning faculties. Once capable of reasoning in this way and not through pleasure, the individual has an ultimate end which he is in constant pursuit of throughout his life which he works towards. Trump then, is incapable of aligning his pleasure of wealth with his reasoning faculties. Such a strong want for money overcomes his rationality, in extreme cases of such pleonexia money is obtained in unlawful, immoral ways, like stealing and money laundering. By choosing our own actions we are responsible for such choices. We warrant ourselves as the makers of our own decisions as means, and the ends, which we strive for through our actions. We arrive only at right action and decision through a process of reasoning, turning this into a habitual process before action to arrive at practical wisdom.

As already mentioned, not born with virtue, it arises from habit. However it is vital we acknowledge the distinction between intellectual virtues and virtues of character. The former are acquired through teaching, for example a child may possess an impressive mathematical ability at age five. Virtues of character however, as one would learn a new skill, like learning the guitar, we get better through practice, like our discussion of habituation. Primarily focussing on the later, virtues of character are central to developing the self, through constant practice of virtues, naturally we can become better, more virtuous beings. Understanding virtues in this way, we see the association virtuous behaviour has to dispositions learnt through both practice and habituation. The more just actions we reflect upon and choose, the more just we become in our nature. By forming habits and sticking to them we get closer to reasoning well.

Virtues, for Aristotle are to be recognised as non-changing, but still very much depend on our independent character. To identify the mean behaviour appropriate to the virtue we are striving for we should reflect inwardly. I may wish for the virtue of courage, to successfully obtain such a virtue it is evident I must show confidence in the face of fear and not cower or run away during difficult situations. By using the doctrine of the mean, it is not uncommon for individuals to sometimes go wrong when choosing and acting. With every virtue there exists two extremes. Considering generosity, to be generous would be the mean virtue, the one worth striving for, consisting of giving at the right time, to the most worth and in need. However, if we do not realise generosity defined in this way we can become either to miserly or not give enough, even when time requires it. In contrast we may become too wasteful, giving to the wrong people and unnecessarily. Prior to reaching the mean we are all accustomed to being pulled towards one of two extremes. Therefore, prior to action we must tread carefully, taking note of the extreme we are most tempted by whilst analysing the situation. By choosing the opposite of what we are most drawn to, it will be more likely that we arrive at the virtue we are reaching for.

The difficulty of considering virtues in this way is that we must learn and determine what is true and right through judgement of our own, it must come as second nature to ourselves and this is only possible if we avoid extremes which we are tempted by. But aren't we all ignorant to our own downfalls? Perhaps I am more egocentric than others, but unless pointed out to by friends or family, or whoever is feeling ballsy enough to confront me, I am usually more often than not, convinced I have made decisions I would class as right and good. Either that, or it is only in retrospect, that I come to realise my choices may have been counterproductive. Is this retrospect too late? Is there anything to be taken from recognising non-virtuous behaviour after the choice has already been made? It is probable I am still in the early stages of learning what it means to practice the wisdom and phronesis Aristotle speaks of.





Next week we shall consider akrasia and phronesis in individuals' conceptions of what virtue is. 



References